The relationship between subjects' identification and categorization learning of integral-dimension stimuli was studied within the framework of an exemplar-based generalization model. The model was used to predict subjects' learning in six different categorization conditions on the basis of data obtained in a single identification learning condition. A crucial assumption in the model is that because of selective attention to component dimensions, similarity relations may change in systematic ways across different experimental contexts. The theoretical analysis provided evidence that, at least under unspeeded conditions, selective attention may play a critical role in determining the identification-categorization relationship for integral stimuli. Evidence was also provided that similarity among exemplars decreased as a function of identification learning. Various alternative classification models, including prototype, multiple-prototype, average distance, and "value-on-dimensions" models, were unable to account for the results.
This article seeks to characterize performance relations between the two fundamental classification paradigms of identification and categorization. Whereas in an identification paradigm people identify stimuli as unique items (a one-to-one stimulus-response mapping), in a categorization paradigm people classify items into groups (a many-to-one stimulus-response mapping). The present study of the identification-categorization relationship is motivated by the recent "exemplar view" of categorization proposed by investigators such as Brooks (1978) , Hintzman and Ludlam (1980) , and Medin and Schaffer (1978) . According to the exemplar view, people represent categories by storing individual category exemplars in memory. Classification decisions are based on the similarity of stimuli to the stored exemplars. This view contrasts with some other approaches that assume that people form category "summary" representations such as a prototype or a rule.
A suggestion that follows from the exemplar view is that there may be highly regular and systematic relations between identification and categorization performance. Presumably, when subjects learn to identify stimuli, a unique representation of each stimulus is stored in memory. Furthermore, the extent to which individual stimuli are confused during identification is This article is t&sed on portions of a PhD dissertation submitted to Harvard University and on subsequent work conducted at Indiana University.
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determined by similarity relations among the stimuli (Monahan & Lockhead, 1977; Shepard, 1958b) . If categorization performance is also determined by similarity relations among individually stored exemplars, then one might be able to predict categorization performance on the basis of identification performance. Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) and Shepard and Chang (1963) undertook a series of seminal studies exploring the identification-categorization relationship with precisely the aforementioned ideas in mind. These investigators proposed an explicit quantitative method for predicting categorization from identification. They argued that not all interitem confusions in an identification condition would show up as errors in a categorization condition. In particular, all interitem confusions in the identification condition that were within-c\as& confusions would result in correct categorization responses. Only those interitem confusions that were between-c\a.s& confusions would result in categorization errors. In general, then, to predict the probability that stimulus / is classified in category J, one should sum over the probabilities that stimulus i is identified as any one of the individual exemplars assigned to category /in a given categorization condition (see Figure 1 ). I will refer to this method of prediction as the mapping hypothesis. The mapping hypothesis is one way of formalizing the idea that the principles of exemplar-based generalization that determine identification will also determine categorization.
A conceptual problem associated with the mapping hypothesis, however, is the implicit assumption that similarity relations among exemplars are invariant across the identification and categorization paradigms. This assumption is rejected by recently proposed exemplar models, most notably Medin and Schaffer's (1978) context model, which emphasizes the role of selective attention in determining stimulus similarity. As an illustration of the role that selective attention may play in influencing similarity and the identification-categorization relationship, consider the diagrams in Figure 2 . Panel A shows a set of eight stimuli varying along three binary-valued dimensions (color, shape, and size). The stimuli are represented by the vertices of a cube, each face of the cube corresponding to a value along one of the dimensions. Panel B illustrates a situation in which subjects begin to attend selectively to the color dimension. Selective attention is represented here in terms of stretching of distance relations along the attended dimension, and shrinking of distance relations along the unattended dimensions (as in the INDSCAL approach to multidimensional scaling, Carroll & Wish, 1974) . Note that by attending selectively to the color dimension, the black stimuli are rendered more similar to one another, and less similar to the white stimuli. Indeed, if one were required to classify all black stimuli into one category and all white stimuli into a second category, the selective attention strategy illustrated in Panel B would benefit performance because it would serve to maximize withio-category similarity among exemplars and minimize between-category similarity. Thus, we see that even if categorization decisions are based on similarity relations among stored exemplars, one might still fail to predict categorization from identification via a direct application of the mapping hypothesis because of the influence of selective attention.
A Unified Quantitative Approach to Modeling
Identification and Categorization
In this article, I test an approach to modeling the identification-categorization relationship that is closely related to the approach adopted by Shepard and his colleagues. The goal is to characterize the identification-categorization relationship in terms of an exemplar-based generalization model-but one that incorporates the influence of selective attention. The theoretical framework around which the research is organized was described in a previous article (Nosofsky, 1986) , However, because it is probably not widely familiar, in the present section I review the theoretical framework and also note its relation to previous approaches. The cell in row /-column j of the matrix would give the conditional probability with which stimulus i is identified as stimulus./. Right panel: An 8 X 2 S-R confusion matrix for a categorization experiment using the same stimuli. The first four stimuli have been assigned to Category A and the second four stimuli to Category B. According to the mapping hypothesis, one predicts the probability that Stimulus 3 is classified in Category A by summing over the probabilities that it is identified as either Stimulus 1,2, 3, or 4 in the identification condition.) The categorization model is a generalized version of the context model of classification proposed by Medin and Schaffer (1978) . According to the context model, the probability that stimulus i is classified in category /, /*(Rj jS,-), is given by 2 Qu
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(I) where 0 <. bj <• 1 and "Lbj = 1. Uppercase letters are used here and throughout the rest of this article to index categories and categorization responses, whereas lowercase letters are used to index individual stimuli and identification responses. The parameter bj represents the bias for making category response J, The value % represents the similarity between exemplars i and j. Thus, the term in the numerator of Equation 1 is the bias for making category response J multiplied by the sum of similarities of stimulus i to all exemplars of category /. We refer to this term as the "strength" of a category J response given presentation of stimulus L This strength is then normalized by the sum of strengths for alt of the categories to determine the categorization probability.
In the special case in which each stimulus defines its own category (namely, an identification experiment), Equation 1 reduces to
(2)
Many researchers will immediately recognize Equation 2 as the classic similarity choice model proposed by Shepard (1957) and Luce (1963) and investigated intensively by researchers such as Townsend (Townsend & Ashby, 1982; Town-send & Landon, 1982) and Smith (1980) . The similarity choice model generally provides excellent accounts of data in identification confusion experiments. Note that Medin and Schaffer's (1978) context model (Equation 1) arises essentially by combining the mapping hypothesis of the identificationcategorization relationship with the assumption that the similarity choice model accurately characterizes identification performance (e.g., see Nosofsky, 1984b, Equation 4 ). The only difference is that the identification response bias parameters in Equation 2 are replaced by categorization response bias parameters in Equation 1.
The relation between Equations 1 and 2 suggests a straightforward means by which to predict categorization from identification. First, one can conduct an identification paradigm and fit the similarity choice model to the confusion data, thereby deriving estimates of the various mj similarity values. Then, for any given categorization paradigm using the same set of stimuli, one can substitute the derived vu values into Equation 1 to generate (bias-free) predictions of categorization performance. This approach, however, is essentially the same as the mapping hypothesis tested by Shepard et al. (1961) and Shepard and Chang (1963) . As illustrated previously, the problem is that the Tj y similarity values in Equations 1 and 2 may not be invariant across the identification and categorization paradigms. What is needed, therefore, is a theory of similarity that allows one to predict context-dependent changes in similarity relations.
Multidimensional Scaling Approach
The theory of similarity that is used is the multidimensional scaling approach. Stimuli are represented as points in a multidimensional space, and similarity is assumed to be some monoton i call y decreasing function of distance in the space. The idea will be to compute similarity among exemplars from a multidimensional scaling solution and to substitute these derived similarity values into Equations 1 and 2 to predict identification and categorization performance.
The specific assumptions that are made for computing similarity are as follows. First, the distance between points x,-and Xj{dij) in the multidimensional space is given by the weighted power model:
where 0 <. c < oo, 0 ^ w k ^ 1, and 2w k = 1. In this equation, xuc is the psychological value of stimulus i on dimension /c, Af is the number of dimensions that compose the stimuli, c is a general sensitivity parameter reflecting discriminability in the psychological space, and w k is the weight given to dimension k in computing overall distance (Carroll & Wish, 1974) . In geometric terms, the weight parameters (w k ) act to to stretch or shrink the psychological space along its coordinate axes (see Figure 2) . In this article, the weight parameters are interpreted as "attention" weights. The values of the attention weights are expected to vary systematically with the structure of the categories to be learned, with greater weight given to dimensions that have greater classificatory significance (e.g,. Medin, 1983; Nosofsky, 1984b Nosofsky, , 1986 Reed, 1972; Shepard etal., 1961; Tversky, 1977) .
The weight parameters will allow us to model context-dependent changes in similarity relations across the identification and categorization paradigms. An extensive body of literature suggests that the value of rin Equation 3 that provides the best description of psychological distance relations depends on the type of dimensions that compose the stimuli. In particular, research points to the Euclidean metric (r = 2) for stimuli varying along integral dimensions, but to something more along the lines of the "city-block" metric (r = 1) for stimuli varying along separable dimensions (see Garner, 1974 , for a review). Integral dimensions are those that combine into relatively unanalyzable, unitary wholes, whereas separable dimensions are highly analyzable, remaining psychologically distinct when in combination (Garner, 1974; Shepard, 1964) .
The distance dy is converted to a similarity measure via the transformation:
Two special cases of Equation 4 have received support in previous research. An exponential decay function (p = 1 in Equation 4) appears to describe accurately the relation between similarity and psychological distance in experimental situations in which subjects learn to classify readily discriminable stimuli (Shepard, 1958a (Shepard, , 1984 (Shepard, , 1986 . As suggested by Shepard (1986) , the exponential decay function is favored in studies involving some form of "cognitive" generalization. By contrast, a Gaussian function (p = 2) tends to be favored in "perceptual" discrimination experiments using highly similar stimuli and extensive discrimination training (Nosofsky, 1984a (Nosofsky, , 1985a (Nosofsky, , 1985b (Nosofsky, , 1986 Shepard, 1986) .
Multidimensional Scaling and the Multiplicative Similarity Rule
In their original formulation of the context model, Medin and Schaffer (1978) proposed a "multiplicative rule" for computing similarity. The stimuli they used in their initial experiments varied along binary-valued separable dimensions. The similarity between stimuli i andy was given by:
where s k was set equal to one if stimuli i and j matched on dimension k: and where s k was set equal to some parameter p k (0 <. p k <. 1) if stimuli / and j mismatched on dimension k. The multiplicative rule is a crucial feature of the context theory differentiating it from some other categorization theories. The multiplicative rule is important because the information from component dimensions is combined interactively, rather than in an independent, additive manner. This feature allows the context model to be sensitive to correlational structure and category density effects (Medin, 1983; Medin, Altom, Edelson, & Freko, 1982; Medin & Schaffer, 1978) .
The multiplicative similarity rule is actually a special case of the present multidimensional scaling approach to modeling similarity. In particular, an interdimensional multiplicative rule arises whenever/? = r in Equations 3 and 4 (Nosofsky, 1986) . So, for example, an interdimensional multiplicative rule would arise if the city-block metric described psychological distance relations and an exponential decay function related similarity to psychological distance. Note that for Media and Schaffer's experiments (classification learning experiments using readily discriminate, separable-dimension stimuli), precisely these functions would be expected to operate. Because the multidimensional scaling approach generalizes Medin and Schaffer's multiplicative similarity rule, I refer to the system of Equations 1,3, and 4 as the generalized context model.
The multidimensional scaling interpretation offers various advantages for purposes of studying categorization performance. For example, whereas Medin and his associates have in effect limited their tests of the context model to stimuli varying along binary-valued dimensions, the present interpretation allows for a straightforward extension of the model to stimuli varying along multivalued continuous dimensions. Once a multidimensional scaling solution is derived, the similarity between any two stimuli will be a function of their distance in the psychological space. As another example, although Medin and his associates have conducted extensive tests of the context model using separable-dimension stimuli, it is unclear how they would propose to compute similarity relations among integral-dimension stimuli. Application of the generalized context model to integral stimuli is straightforward. Instead of using a city-block metric for computing psychological distance, a Euclidean metric is used.
Motivation for the Present Experiments
Nosofsky (1986) has already reported some preliminary tests of the theoretical framework just outlined. In one condition, two subjects identified a set of perceptually confusable stimuli varying along two continuous, separable dimensions. Following identification, the same two subjects categorized the stimuli. Four different category structures were tested. The identification confusion data were analyzed using the similarity choice model with the assumption that the % similarity parameters are functionally related to distances in a multidimensional space. By fitting this multidimensional scaling (MDS)-choice model (Equations 2,3, and 4) to the identification data, an MDS solution was derived for the stimulus set. This MDS solution was then used in conjunction with the generalized context model (GCM) to predict performance in the four categorization conditions. Generally speaking, good predictions of categorization performance were achieved. Furthermore, evidence was obtained that subjects distributed attention among the component dimensions that composed the stimuli so as to optimize performance in each categorization condition. The results provided preliminary support for the idea that one may be able to interpret the identification-categorization relationship in terms of the principles of exemplar-based generalization.
The main purpose of the present research was to continue the study of the identification-categorization relationship and provide additional tests of the GCM. One objection that may be raised regarding the generalizability of Nosofeky's (1986) previously reported results is that prior to categorizing the stimuli, the subjects had engaged in extensive discrimination training in an identification paradigm. Thus, because subjects had had extensive experience with each of the individual exemplars in the stimulus set, it is perhaps not too surprising that support was found for an exemplar-based generalization model in the categorization conditions. In the present study, the identification and categorization conditions are run as between-subject designs, so that when subjects engage in category learning they are experiencing the exemplars for the first time.
The present research involves two other extensions of the earlier work reported by Nosofsky (1986) . First, in its present form the GCM is a "static" model in the sense that it is intended to account for categorization performance at a given stage of learning or under experimental conditions in which performance is stable. In the present investigation, the model is augmented to include assumptions about learning processes, and relations between identification and categorization learning are examined. The hope is to gain information about the learning side of identification and categorization learning.
Second, whereas in the previous study the GCM was applied to account for the categorization of separable-dimension stimuli, in the present study integral-dimension stimuli are used. The use of integral stimuli raises interesting questions regarding the role of selective attention in determining the identificationcategorization relation. A well-known operation for distinguishing between integral and separable dimensions is the speeded classification task using orthogonal dimensions (Garner & Felfoldy, 1970) . If subjects are required to classify objects on the basis of one dimension, and a second irrelevant dimension is allowed to vary, interference is observed if the dimensions are integral, but not if they are separable. The basic interpretation is that whereas subjects are able to attend selectively to the relevant dimension and filter the irrelevant one for separable stimuli, they are unable to do so for integral stimuli.
However, a failure of selective attention in a speeded classification task does not necessarily imply that subjects cannot analyze integral stimuli into their component dimensions under unspeeded conditions. The classic example of integral-dimension stimuli is Munsell colors varying in brightness and saturation. As noted by Garner (1974, p. 120 ), "we must remember that subjects can differentiate integral dimensions, since that is how, after all, the Munsell color system was developed." Lockhead (1972) argued that both integral and separable stimuli are analyzable. He suggested that an integral stimulus is first processed as a single point or "blob" in a multidimensional space, which can then be further analyzed in subsequent information processing stages.
Recent work by Foard and Kemler Nelson (1984) provides empirical evidence that analytic processing of integral dimensions does sometimes occur, although it is less efficient than analytic processing of separable dimensions. Indeed, Foard and Kemler Nelson suggested that the central issue is not whether analytic processing of integral dimensions can occur, but rather, to determine under what conditions it will occur. The question asked in the present study, then, is whether subjects will tend to adopt a selective attention strategy in learning to categorize integral stimuli.
It is important to note that the early work of Shepard and his colleagues has bearing on this question. Shepard et al. (1961) studied the identification-categorization relationship by using stimuli varying along separable dimensions. In this situation the mapping hypothesis failed dramatically, with categorization learning departing in striking ways from what was predicted on the basis of identification learning. Shepard et al. (see also Shepard, 1964) suggested that a process of selective attention intervened between the identification and categorization tasks, an occurrence that was made particularly likely by the fact that separable-dimension stimuli were used. Therefore, Shepard and Chang (1963) decided to test the mapping hypothesis anew by using stimuli that seemed relatively unanalyzable, namely a set of integral-dimension Munsell colors. Much better predictions of categorization performance were obtained in this latter study than in the earlier one, suggesting that selective attention may not play a major role when subjects learn to categorize integral stimuli. A general conclusion that has been gleaned from these studies was summarized recently by Tversky and Gati (1982, p. 137) : "Shepard and his collaborators (Shepard & Chang, 1963; Shepard et al., 1961) have shown that the difficulty of classification learning is predictable from pairwise confusions in identification learning for integral stimuli but not for separable stimuli because of considerations of selective attention."
Unfortunately, the relative analyzability of the stimulus dimensions used by Shepard et al. (1961) and Shepard and Chang (1963) was not the only difference between these studies. A second, and possibly more important, factor was that the category structures used in the two studies were different. Shepard et al. studied the identification-categorization relationship by using stimuli that varied along three binary-valued dimensions, whereas Shepard and Chang used stimuli varying along two continuous dimensions. Moreover, inspection of the actual category structures studied by Shepard and Chang (1963, Figure 2 ) reveals that, in general, both dimensions tended to be relevant for learning the various categorizations. Thus, the conclusion that selective attention does not play a major role in determining the identification-categorization relationship for integral stimuli may not be warranted, because it would have been suboptimal to attend to only one dimension. With the aforementioned concerns in mind, the present study follows up on the investigation initiated by Shepard and Chang by using category structures that might more readily provide evidence for the operation of a selective attention process.
Overall Design
The research presented in this article involved two experimental phases. In Experiment 1, subjects learned to identify a set of 12 Munsell colors varying along the integral dimensions of brightness and saturation. In Experiment 2, separate groups of subjects learned to categorize this same set of colors. Six different category structures were tested. The theoretical goal is to achieve a unified characterization of the identification and categorization learning data within the exemplar-based, multidimensional scaling-choice framework.
The identification learning data are analyzed using the MDSchoice model. Although various researchers have previously fitted the model to identification confusion data with success (e.g., Getty, Swets, Swets, & Green, 1979; Nosofsky, 1985a Nosofsky, , 1985b Shepard, 1985b) , a unique contribution of the present analysis is a preliminary attempt to characterize the learning processes involved in identification learning. The main purpose of testing the identification learning condition, however, is simply to derive an MDS solution for the stimulus set. This MDS solution will then be used in conjunction with the GCM to pre- diet performance in the six categorization conditions tested in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1: Identification Learning Condition

Method
Subjects. Subjects were 34 undergraduates at Harvard University who were hired for participation in the identification learning condition. All subjects claimed to have normal color vision.
Stimuli. The stimuli were 12 color chips manufactured by the Munsell Color Company. According to the Munsell system, the colors were of a constant red hue (5R), but varied in brightness (value) and saturation (chroma). For purposes of reporting the experimental results, the colors are labeled by the numbers 1 through 12. The color set is shown schematically in Figure 3 .
The color chips were 10/16 X 13/16 in. (1.58 cm x 2.06 cm) in size, and were mounted on 3 x 5 in. (7.62 cm x 12.70 cm) white index cards. To ensure that subjects were attending to the actual colors and not to incidental markings on the chips or cards, 10 different chips were used for each of the colors. Thus, a total of 120 stimulus cards was used.
Procedure. On any given trial, a subject viewed a stimulus card and spoke aloud the response for the color. The responses were the numbers 1 through 12. For each subject a different random assignment of responses to stimuli was used. After making the response, the subject turned over the card and viewed the correct answer. The subject spoke this number aloud and then restudied the color. The response and correct answer on each trial were recorded by the experimenter.
An experimental session was organized into 3 blocks of 108 trials each. Prior to giving any responses, the subjects viewed each of the 12 colors in a random order and studied the numbers that were assigned to them. These 12 stimulus cards were then discarded. On the first block of each session the remaining 108 stimulus cards were presented in a random order. On each subsequent block the cards were shuffled by the experimenter.
Each subject was tested individually in a single experimental session.. The experiment was self-paced and lasted approximately I hr. Small bonuses were paid if at any time during the experiment 24 consecutive correct responses were made. Note. Top line in each row = observed frequencies; bottom line in each row = predicted frequencies.
Results
The stimulus-response (S-R) confusion matrix obtained for each block in the identification learning condition is presented in Table 1 . The grand confusion matrix obtained by cumulating over the blocks is also presented. The data obtained in the first and second halves of each block were analyzed, and it was found that average percentage correct in the learning sequence was 36%, 52%, 66%, 71%, 76%, and 81%. Evidently, there was steady improvement in identification performance over trials.
Inspection of the confusion matrices reveals that they are highly structured. The identification errors are not uniformly distributed throughout the matrix. Rather, some of the off-diagonal cells have relatively large entries and others have relatively small entries. Furthermore, the pattern of errors appears to be fairly stable across the three learning blocks. Cells with large entries in Block i also tend to have large entries in Blocks 2 and 3, and so forth. The challenge to the theoretical analysis is to characterize this structural invariance and the learning processes that were involved in terms of an integrated model.
Theoretical A nalysis
Procedure for fitting and testing models. Throughout this article the various models are fitted to the identification and categorization confusion data using a maximum-likelihood criterion. Although many researchers may be more familiar with a least squares criterion, this latter measure is inappropriate in the present situation. A least squares criterion considers only the absolute deviations among the predicted and observed frequencies in the cells of the confusion matrix. So, for example, a deviation of 20 observations contributes equally to the total sum of squared deviations whether the cell contains 5 or 305 observations. Clearly, however, relative deviations also need to be considered. That is, a difference between 5 and 25 observations should be weighted more heavily than a difference between 305 and 325 observations in determining the overall fit. A least squares criterion is inappropriate because the error variance associated with each of the cells in the confusion matrix is not constant.
To gain information regarding the importance of the various model parameters, a standard statistical procedure known as likelihood ratio testing is used. A restricted version of a model arises whenever some of the parameters in the model are held fixed on a priori grounds. Likelihood ratio tests are used to determine whether the fit of a restricted model is significantly worse than that of a more general, unrestricted one (see Wickens, 1982, chap. 6 , for an excellent discussion of this procedure). Lei L be the likelihood of a data set given the maximumlikelihood parameters in the unrestricted model, and let L* be the likelihood of the data set given the parameters irt the restricted model. Assuming the restricted model is correct, then for large sample size, the quantity x 2 = 2(ln L -In L*) has approximately a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters that were constrained in moving from the unrestricted to the restricted model. If this quantity exceeds the critical value of chi-square, then the restricted model is rejected as being significantly worse than the unrestricted one, and one would conclude that some of the parameters in the restricted model were constrained inappropriately.
Dynamic MDS-choice model In this article the identification learning process is conceptualized as consisting of two components. The first component is a discrimination-learning process. It is assumed that with increased experience, subjects learn to differentiate stimuli that are similar to one another. Note that I am referring here to some form of memorial similarity. It seems unlikely that perceptual confusability played a major role in the present experiments. The stimuli were presented under normal viewing conditions for unlimited exposure durations and were of sufficient perceptual dissimilarity so as never to be confused, for example, in a simultaneous presentation "same-different" task. The notion, then, is that subjects* memory representations for the stimuli may become more discriminablc as a function of learning.
A second component of the learning process is the responselearning component. In Experiment 1, each stimulus was assigned an arbitrary response label. Thus, besides learning to distinguish between similar stimuli, subjects needed to learn the prevailing stimulus-response assignments. The idea that identification learning consists of two component processes-learning to discriminate among similar stimuli and learning to attach appropriate response labels to these stimuli-dates back at least to Gibson (1940;  see also Gibson & Gibson, 1955) , although the results of experimental tests of the idea have been somewhat ambiguous (see Ellis, 1973, pp. 169-173 , for a review). Here, the idea is tested by formalizing the component processes in terms of an explicit quantitative model and fitting that model to identification learning data.
As a descriptive model for the probability that the subject identifies stimulus i as stimulus,/ on trial n, /* B {Rj|Sf), I use the following extended version of the MDS-choice model given by Equations 2-4:
.
Equations 6 and 7 will be referred to as the dynamic MDSchoice model. Note first that Equation 7 assumes a Euclidean metric for computing psychological distance relations and an exponential decay function for relating similarity to distance. As discussed earlier, these component assumptions have received a great deal of support in previous research for the type of experimental situation currently being studied. Also, in the identification condition, the weight parameters (w k ) are nonidentifiable with respect to the stimulus coordinates (*,*). Because the psychological dimensions appear to be approximately equally relevant for performing the identifications (see Figure  3) , I set Wi = w 2 -Vi in Equation 7 (i.e., nondifferential selective attention is assumed). The dynamic MDS-choice model extends the static model in two respects. First, there is the use of a guessing parameter (g) in Equation 6, intended to represent the situation in which a particular stimulus is chosen, but the response label for that stimulus is as yet unavailable. Because the subjects are required to respond on every trial, some guessing will have to be made. It is assumed that all guesses are equally likely-thus, the term gf 12. An alternative guessing strategy is considered in the Appendix. Note that the value of the guessing parameter is allowed to depend on trial n. Presumably, one should observe decreases in g as the number of trials increases and the response assignments are learned.
The second extension is that the sensitivity parameter (c) in Equation 7 is also assumed to depend on trial number. The sensitivity parameter is intended to model changes in subjects' discriminative capabilities over time. It is expected that the value of c will increase steadily as a function of trials. In geometric terms, the sensitivity parameter modulates overall distance relations in the psychological space. This notion of modeling identification learning in terms of increasing distance was suggested previously by Shepard (1957, p. 342, Equation 52 ). However, in his actual tests of the MDS-choice model, Shepard (1958b) fitted only cumulated learning data, and so no evidence was provided to support the idea of increasing distance (i.e., decreasing similarity) over trials.
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The dynamic MDS-choice model was fitted simultaneously to the three blocked learning matrices in Table 1 using a maximum-likelihood criterion. The parameters in the model are 24 multidimensional scaling coordinates (x ik \ 12 bias parameters (bj), and 3 values each of c and g (one value estimated for each block). The prediced confusion frequencies for each block in the learning sequence are shown rounded to the nearest integer alongside the observed frequencies in Table 1 . The summary fits are reported in Table 2 . The dynamic MDS-choice model accounts for 97.5%, 99.6%, and 99.7% of the response variance in matrices 1, 2, and 3, respectively. When the theoretical frequencies are pooled and compared to the observed frequencies in the cumulated matrix, one finds that the model accounts for 99.84% of the variance. The dynamic MDS-choice model provides an impressive description of the data, thereby providing support for the present conceptualization of the identification learning process. The best-fitting parameters are reported in Table 3 . Because distance relationships are invariant under rigid rotations of a Euclidean space, the following procedure was used to determine the orientation of the scaling solution. The classic Munsell scaling solution was taken as a base solution.
2 The coordinates obtained in the present MDS solution were then transformed so as to minimize the sum of squared deviations with the corresponding points in the Munsell solution. The transformation was effected by translating the coordinate space horizontally and vertically, scaling it by a multiplicative factor, and then rotating it. The best-fitting rotation was taken as the orientation of the coordinate space. The transformed coordinates are shown plotted with the Munsell coordinates in Figure 4 . There appears to be a fairly good correspondence between the two solutions.
Note that the guessing and sensitivity parameters changed regularly as a function of learning (see Table 3 ). Virtually all guessing behavior was confined to the first block. Also, there was steady growth in the sensitivity parameter, providing support for the idea that subjects' memory representations for the stimuli became more discriminable over time.
To test if the increase in the sensitivity parameter was statisti-1 Shepard (1958b) used the following augmented version of the MDSchoice model to fit the cumulated learning data:
Note. In L = log likelihood; SSE = sum of squared deviations between observed and predicted categorization probabilities; % Var. = percentage of variance accounted for.
where the parameter H was intended to account for the essentially random guessing behavior that occurred early in the learning sequence (before any stimulus-response associations had been learned). In the present article, the guessing parameter (g) in Equation 6 plays the same role as H in Shepard's equation. I prefer the present approach because the guessing parameter has a simple process interpretation.
2 Following Shepard (1958b, p. 514) , I assumed for the Munsell scaling solution that two units of chroma (saturation) is psychologically equivalent to one unit of value (brightness). This assumption was based on earlier conclusions reached by Nickerson (1936) . rally significant, a restricted version of the dynamic MDSchoice model was fitted to the data in which the sensitivity parameter was held constant over blocks. The summary fits for this restricted model are reported in Table 2 . According to a likelihood ratio test, the deterioration in overall fit was highly significant, x z {2) = 331.2, p < .0001. The restricted dynamic MDS-choice model had noticeable difficulty accounting for the confusion data in Blocks 1 and 3 of the learning sequence. In Block 3, the model systematically underestimated the frequencies of correct identification responses and overestimated the frequencies of incorrect identification responses. The opposite pattern emerged in Block 1, although it appeared that the model tried to compensate by increasing the value of the guessing parameter (g t ). However, this adjustment of g x led to another source of systematic error, namely the overestimation of confusion frequencies for pairs of highly dissimilar stimuli (e.g., 1 and 12).
One should take note of the interpretation of the bias parameters (bj) in the present situation. Usually, the bias parameters are interpreted as being attached to responses, independent of the properties of the stimuli. In this experiment, however, each of the subjects learned to identify the'stimuli under a different stimulus-response assignment. Thus, the bj parameters are more appropriately viewed as stimulus biases than as response biases. Shepard (1957) used the term stimulus weights rather than response biases in referring to these parameters, and suggested that they may be representing some form of stimulus "salience."
Summary. The dynamic MDS-choice model provides an excellent description of the subjects* identification learning. Besides providing good fits to data, the model parameters vary in easily interpretable ways. There is steady growth in the sensitivity parameter, and steady decline in the guessing parameter.
Furthermore, the multidimensional scaling solution that was obtained corresponds nicely with the Munsell solution.
Although the identification learning data appear to be interpretable in terms of the processes formalized in the dynamic MDS-choice model, I do not, of course, rule out the possibility that some alternative conceptualizations may provide an equally good account of the data. A preliminary investigation of some alternative learning models, implemented as computer simulations, is reported in the Appendix. The main purpose of investigating these alternative models was to gain information as to how seriously one should interpret the decreases in similarity relations associated with the dynamic MDS-choice model. In each of the alternative models, it was assumed that interstimuius similarity relations remain constant during the learning sequence. In one model, learning was formalized in terms of the gradual attachment of response labels to the stimulus memory representations. However, rather than assuming that subjects guess randomly if a stimulus is chosen that does not have an associated response label, a resampling process was assumed to occur. Pure guessing occurred only after k unsuccessful samples. In another model the learning process was formalized in terms of the probabilistic storage of exemplars in memory (Estes, 1986a (Estes, , 1986b . Neither model provided as good a fit to the identification learning data as a computer-simulated version of the dynamic MDS-choice model, although they both performed substantially better than the restricted dynamic MDSchoice model (see the Appendix for a comparison of the model fits). Clearly, the various component processes involved in identification learning may interact in complex ways, and a great deal of additional research will be required before these component processes can be isolated and understood. I conclude simply that the results from Experiment 1 provide some support for one candidate model of the identification learning process. A central assumption of this model is that overall similarity relations among exemplars decrease as a function of identification learning.
Experiment 2: Categorization Learning Conditions
The central goal of this research involves the prediction of categorization learning on the basis of the data observed in the identification learning condition. By fitting the dynamic MDSchoice model to the identification data, a multidimensional scaling solution was derived for the stimulus set. This multidimensional scaling solution is now used in conjunction with the GCM to predict performance in six different categorization conditions using the same set of stimuli. In addition to testing the GCM, we also test the hypothesis that, because of selective attention, similarity relations among exemplars change systematically across the identification and categorization paradigms. Various alternative categorization models are also considered on their ability to account for the categorization data.
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 24 undergraduates at Harvard University who were hired for participation in two categorization conditions and 167 undergraduates at Indiana University who were tested in four additional categorization conditions. The latter subjects received psychology course credit. None of the subjects had participated in the identification Note. \Wues in brackets are the approximate numbers of observations on which each probability is based. learning condition of Experiment 1. All subjects claimed to have normal color vision.
Observed and Generalized Context Model (GCM) Predicted Probabilities of Category 1 Responses for Each Stim ulus
Stimuli The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. Procedure. The category structures that were used are illustrated schematically in Figure 5 . For three of the category structures [saturation (A), saturation (B), and brightness], one of the dimensions is clearly more relevant than the other for performing the classification. For the other three category structures (crisscross, diagonal, pink-brown 3 ), both dimensions are approximately equally relevant. The three unidimensional categorizations were conducted with the aim of providing evidence for the operation of a selective attention process. The three two-dimensional categorizations were conducted to provide additional tests of the GCM and to distinguish its predictions from those of other models (see ensuing sections).
On any given trial in the categorization condition, a subject viewed a stimulus card and guessed the category to which the stimulus was assigned (either 1 or 2). The subject entered the response on a score sheet and then turned over the card to view the correct answer. A code number was also entered on the back of the card to identify the stimulus for the experimenter. The subject entered this code number on the score sheet next to the category response and then restudied the stimulus-response mapping. Stimulus cards that were not assigned to either category were blank on the back except for the code number.
Each categorization condition was tested for 2 blocks of 120 trials, except for the saturation (A) condition, which was tested for only a single block. [Fewer trials were devoted to the saturation (A) condition because pilot work indicated it was a very easy categorization to learn.] The Harvard undergraduates participated in the crisscross and saturation (A) conditions. Half learned the crisscross categorization first and half learned the saturation (A) categorization first. The Indiana under-graduates participated in the remaining four conditions, and each subject participated in only one condition. In the diagonal, brightness, saturation (B), and pink-brown conditions, 38,49,40, and 40 subjects were tested, respectively.
Subjects began to make their category guesses immediately, without preliminary stimulus presentations. On the first block of each session, the stimuli were presented in a predetermined random order that differed for each subject. On subsequent blocks the experimenter shuffled the deck of cards.
At the start of the experiment, the subjects were informed that some of the stimuli were not assigned to either category. Furthermore, they were informed that they might eventually come to recognize these unassigned stimuli. In this case, they were supposed to place the stimulus into the category to which they believed it should be assigned, on the basis of their learning up to that point.
The subjects were tested individually in a single session that lasted approximately 1 hr. The experiment was self-paced. Subjects were encouraged to respond accurately.
Results
The analyses focus on the data obtained during the second block of each of the categorization conditions, except for the saturation (A) condition, where I analyze the final 90 trials of the single block that was tested. These data are summarized in Table 4 , which gives the proportion of Category 1 responses for each stimulus in each condition.
Although the main goal of the study involves a characterization of these data in terms of the GCM, it is also useful to characterize them in a manner that is independent of some of the specific assumptions made in the model. The approach taken here is to compare the observed categorization probabilities with the probabilities that are predicted by applying the mapping hypothesis. On the one hand, because the principles of exemplar-based generalization that operated in the identification condition are also expected to operate in the categorization conditions, the mapping hypothesis might be expected to yield good predictions of the categorization data. On the other hand, because of the influence of selective attention, similarity relations among exemplars may have been modified across the identification and categorization conditions. To the extent that a selective attention process intervened, the observed categorization probabilities should deviate systematically from the mapping hypothesis predictions.
The specific deviations that are predicted are illustrated schematically in Figure 6 . The upper diagrams in the figure show the structure of the saturation (A), saturation (B), and brightness categorizations with nondifferential selective attention to the component dimensions. The lower diagrams show the structure of these same categorizations after modification by selective attention. Recall that selective attention is represented in terms of stretching of distance relations along the attended, relevant dimension, and shrinking of distance relations along the unattended, irrelevant dimension.
Consider the saturation (A) categorization. With nondifferential selective attention, Transfer Stimuli 2 and 4 are slightly more similar overall to the Category 1 exemplars than to the Category 2 exemplars. With selective attention to the relevant saturation dimension, however, Transfer Stimuli 2 and 4 begin to take on greater similarity to the Category 2 exemplars. Also, Transfer Stimulus 8 becomes even more similar to the Category 1 exemplars than under conditions of nondiiferential selective attention. Thus, to the extent that selective attention intervened between the identification and categorization conditions, it is predicted that the observed probability of classifying Transfer Stimuli 2 and 4 in Category 1 will be less than what is predicted by the mapping hypothesis, whereas the observed probability of classifying Transfer Stimulus 8 in Category 1 will be greater than predicted by the mapping hypothesis. Analogous predictions are made for the saturation (B) and brightness categorizations. In the saturation (B) categorization, it is predicted that the probability of classifying Transfer Stimuli 9, It, and 12 in Category I will be less than predicted by the mappiag hypothesis. And in the brightness categorization, it is predicted that the probability of classifying Transfer Stimuli 1, 3, and 5 in Category t will be greater than predicted by the mapping hypothesis. I win refer to the transfer stimuli for which clear-cut predictions have been made as critical transfer stimuli. For the remaining noncritical transfer stimuli and also the assigned category exemplars, the selective attention process is not expected to exert as dramatic an effect on the classification probabilities and the mapping hypothesis should provide a good first approximation to the data.
The observed classification probabilities are plotted against the mapping hypothesis predicted probabilities in Figure 7 . 4 Panel A shows the comparisons for the assigned exemplars and Honcritical transfer stimuli. Here, the mapping hypothesis yields good predictions, accounting for 98% of the observed variance in the data. By contrast, the mapping hypothesis fails dramatically in Panel B, which shows the comparisons for the critical transfer stimuli. Moreover, all the deviations are in the direction predicted by the selective attention hypothesis, as indicated by the arrows on the graph. Taken together, the results shown in Figure 7 , Panels A and B, are consistent with the idea that the principles of exemplar-based generalization that operated in the identification condition also operated in the categorization conditions. I am not referring to an invariant form of exemplar-based generalization, but rather, to one that is modifiable by selective attention. I now turn to a direct theoretical analysis in terms of the GCM to provide additional support for this view.
Theoretical Analysis
Generalized context model The same MDS solution that operated in the identification condition is assumed to operate in the categorization conditions. Also, it is assumed that a Euclidean distance metric and exponential decay similarity function continue to operate. Because subjects are classifying stimuli into two categories, the GCM is summarized as follows:
where 0 ^ Bj, W| £ 1, andO <. c < oo. The parameter B\ is the bias for making Category Response R|, the parameter c is the general sensitivity parameter, and the parameter w x is the attention weight given to Dimension 1 (saturation). The values x& are given by the MDS solution for the stimulus set (see Table  3 ), Note that the individual stimulus biases {bj) estimated from the identification data are incorporated in the categorization decision rule. In previous tests of the context model, these bias values were not used, either because they were unavailable or because they were interpreted as response biases that were subject to change when the response set was changed. In the present study, it was found that the GCM provided slightly better fits to the categorization data when the stimulus biases were included.
The GCM was fitted to the categorization data using a maximum-likelUjood criterion. Note that for each condition, three parameters (c» w it and i?|) were estimated to account for 12 data values that were free to vary. I will refer to this full, threeparameter version of the GCM as Version I, To gain insight into the importance of the attention weight and category bias parameters, several restricted versions of the GCM were also fitted to the data. In Version 2 S the value of the attention weight parameter was set at w s = Vi (nondifferential selective attention); in Version 3, the value of the category bias parameter was set at J?| ~ l h (nondifferential response bias); and in Version 4, both the attention weight and bias parameters were set at l h.
The maximum-likelihood parameters and summary fits for each version of the GCM are reported in Table 5 , The full model (Versioa 1) provides a good description of the categorization data, accounting for an average of 98.6% of the variance across the six conditions. These results provide support for the GCM and for the exemplar view of category representation.
Impressively, the fits for restricted Version 3 of the GCM (in which the category bias parameter was held fixed at B xl h) are essentially identical to those achieved by the full model Indeed, the reductions in overall fit are not statistically significant in any of the categorization conditions except for a small effect is the saturation (B) condition, x 2 ( 1) -4.0, p < .05. In general, it appears that differential category response bias did not play a major role in the present experiments. By contrast, the reductions in fit that result when the attention weight parameter is constrained at w t = x h (Version 2) are statistically significant (p < .001) in all the conditions except the pink-brown categorization, x 2 d) * 11-0, 57.3, 80.6, 147.8, and 253 .2 in the crisscross, diagonal, saturation (A), saturation (B), and brightness categorizations, respectively. The reduction in fit is dramatic in the saturation (A) and (B) and brightness conditions, where the influence of selective attention was expected to be greatest, Taken together, these results imply that there were systematic 4 The identification data used for applying the mapping hypothesis are the cumulated data in Table! . On the basis of the theoretical analysis of the identification learning data in Experiment I, it was estimated that an average of 3.77 entries in each cell of the matrix was the result of random guessing and not similarity-based confusions. Thus, the value 3.77 was subtracted from each cell of the matrix before making the predictions. (Occasional negative values that resulted were set equal to zero,) The conditional probability of identifying stimulus ias stimulus/ was then calculated by dividing the entry in row /-cell j by the sum of entries in row /' , To predict the probabil ily that stimulus i is classified in category j t one then sums over all conditional probabilities in row / that represent confusions between stimuli i and those stimuli assigned to category,/ in the given categorization condition. For category structures in which unassigsed transfer stimuli were used, the predicted probabilities of classifying in category 1 or 2 were normalized so that they added up to one. Note, c = general sensitivity parameter, wj = attention weight given to Dimension 1 (saturation); B t = bias for making Category Response R,; SSE = sum of squared deviations between observed and predicted categorization probabilities; % Var. = percent variance accounted for; and In L = log likelihood. Underlined values were fixed a priori. changes in similarity relations (as denned by the 77 rj -parameters in Equations 6 and 8) across the identification and categorization paradigms.
The GCM predicted Category 1 response probabilities are compared to the observed probabilities in Table 4 . Because differential response bias apparently was not involved, I restrict the comparisons to Versions 3 and 4 of the model. Inspection of the observed and predicted data for the unidimensional categorizations reveals that the major source of improvement that is obtained when the attention weight parameter is allowed to vary lies in the critical transfer stimuli discussed earlier-particularly Stimuli 2 and 8 in the saturation (A) condition; 11 and 12 in the saturation (B) condition; and 1,3, and 5 in the brightness condition. In sum, the identification-categorization relationship for these integral stimuli is well characterized in terms of an exemplar-based generalization model that incorporates the influence of selective attention.
Alternative models. In this section some recently proposed alternative categorization models are considered on their ability to account for the observed data. Perhaps the most well-known model for the categorization of continuous dimension stimuli is the prototype model. As formalized by Reed (1972) , the prototype is defined as the centroid for all points in the multidimensional space that are associated with a given category. Let p jk be the value of the category j prototype on dimension k. Also, let rjiPj denote the similarity between stimulus i and prototype Pj. The model tested here assumed that (10) mpj = exp [-c(w,(x,-i -pji 
(11) The p )k coordinates are computed from the multidimensional scaling solution for the stimulus set. The parameters in the model are the sensitivity parameter (c), category bias parameter (fii), and attention weight parameter (wj).
The maximum-likelihood parameters and overall fits are presented in the top part of Table 6 . Comparison with Table 5 reveals that the prototype model yields essentially the same fits as the GCM for the saturation (A) and brightness categorizations. However, it does substantially worse in the saturation (B) and pink-brown categorizations, and is unable to account for the data in the crisscross and diagonal categorizations. The reason becomes obvious upon inspection of the crisscross and diagonal category structures-in both conditions, the centroids for the Category 1 members and the Category 2 members virtually overlap. In the prototype model a summary representation is formed by averaging information independently over component dimensions. Such a model will often have problems when the exemplars of a given category have correlated values on their component dimensions. Averaging independently over the component dimensions then leads to a loss of information regarding the correlational structure. The categories in the crisscross and diagonal conditions provide simple examples of this type of situation.
An investigator wishing to hold on to the prototype idea might posit that multiple prototypes are formed to represent "disjunctive" categories such as the crisscross and diagonal. The evidence in favor of a Category 1 response would then be -921.7 -43.3 -735.0 -48.6 -130.8 -154.1 -59.4 -229.8 -139.5 Note, c = general sensitivity parameter, w, = attention weight given to Dimension 1 (saturation); B, = bias for making Category Response R,; SSE = sum of squared deviations between observed and predicted categorization probabilities; % Van = percent variance accounted for; and In L = log likelihood.
given by the sum of similarities of a given stimulus to each of the Category 1 prototypes, and so forth. To test this idea, the decision rule given by Equation 10 was generalized as follows:
In the crisscross categorization, it was assumed that separate Category 1 prototypes were formed for stimulus pairs 1-3 and 9-12, and that separate Category 2 prototypes were formed for stimulus pairs 2-4 and 8-10. In the diagonal categorization, two multiple-prototype models were tested. Both models assumed that separate Category I prototypes were formed for stimulus groups 1-2-3-5 and 7-9-11-12. In the first version, a single Category 2 prototype was formed for group 4-6-8-10; in the second version, separate Category 2 prototypes were formed for pairs 4-6 and 8-10. The maximum-likelihood parameters and summary fits for each of the multiple-prototype models are presented in the bottom part of Table 6 . Although the fits are better than for the single-prototype model, they are still worse than those obtained for the GCM.
It is of interest to note that in the diagonal categorization, the goodness of fit for the multiple-prototype model (Version 2) would be reduced substantially if the category bias parameter were not used, with the sum of squared deviations increasing from. 100 to .344 (and the value of In L decreasing from -139.5 to -337.5). Recall that for the GCM, the category bias parameter was superfluous. An interesting feature of the GCM response rule is that it preserves relative frequency information (Busemeyer, Dewey, & Medin, 1984; Estes, 1986a; Homa, Sterling, & Trepel, 1981) . The evidence in favor of a category J response is found by summing the similarities of a given stimulus to each of the individual category / exemplars. Thus, other things being equal, the larger the size of category 7, the greater will be the summed similarity and resulting probability of a category J response. In the diagonal categorization, there were eight exemplars in Category 1 and four exemplars in Category 2. The Version 2 multiple-prototype model assumed two prototypes for each of Categories 1 and 2. Thus, the differential relative frequency information was not reflected in its response rule. It appears that the rather large value of the category bias parameter (B l = .67) was needed to compensate for this shortcoming. Even with the additional parameter, of course, the three-parameter multiple-prototype model fared worse than the two-parameter GCM.
An objection that may be raised regarding these analyses concerns the question of whether or not the category structures that were tested were "natural," particularly the crisscross and diagonal categorizations. For example, one might argue that prototype models were intended to account for the learning of only natural category structures, and so I may have gone outside the appropriate boundary conditions for the testing of prototype models. Regardless of whether the present category structures may be considered natural, they do appear to have a simple logical structure and the question of how people learn to categorize dimensionally organized perceptual stimuli would seem to be of inherent interest. Furthermore, subjects clearly were able to learn the categories and a highly regular and systematic set of learning data was obtained. Rather than marking out a priori particular domains that are "appropriate" to study, an alternative approach is one of discovering the particular experimental conditions under which different classification strategies appear to operate. At least under the current experimental conditions, the exemplar-based generalization model appears to provide a more accurate and general account of category learning than do prototype models. Under different experimental conditions, more evidence may be found for a prototype-based form of category representation. For example, an interesting question for future research is whether a prototype representation would develop for these categories if there were long delays between initial classification learning and subsequent test.
Other alternative categorization models also have their problems accounting for these data. In its present form, Fried and Holyoak's (1984) distribution learning model assumes categories that are normally distributed over independent dimensions, an assumption that is too restrictive to handle the present conditions. Property-set models (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Reitman & Bower, 1973) and production system models (Anderson, Kline, &Beasley, 1979; Elio& Anderson, 1981) assume that stimuli are composed of discrete features, and would need to be augmented to account for the categorization of continuous dimension stimuli. The average distance model (e.g., Reed, 1972 ) is unable to provide adequate quantitative fits to these data, and in some cases makes incorrect qualitative predictions. For example, in the diagonal categorization, the average distance between Stimulus 5 and the Category 1 members is greater than that for the Category 2 members. (This is true whether distance is computed using the MDS-choice model solution or the more neutral Munsell scaling solution.) Yet Stimulus 5 was classified well above chance in the experiments reported here. This example illustrates that the transformation of distances into similarities (Equation 4) using a nonlinear (e.g., exponential) function is crucial for generating successful categorization predictions.
Rule-Based Models
Ashby and his associates (Ashby & Gott, 1986; Ashby & Perrin, 1986; Ashby & Townsend, 1986 ) are currently developing a "general recognition theory," which is essentially a multidimensional generalization of signal detection theory (or of Thurstone's, 1927, "law of categorical judgment"). A multidimensional stimulus is assumed to give rise to a distribution of perceptual effects. The subject establishes decision boundaries that partition the multidimensional space into response regions. Any perceptual effect that falls into region A would result in a category A response. The theory formalizes nicely the notion of rule-based categorization under conditions of imperfect discriminability.
To use the general recognition theory to predict categorization data, a number of simplifying assumptions need to be made. For example, assumptions need to be made regarding the form of the distributions of perceptual effects as well as the types of decision boundaries that are adopted. Ashby and Gott (1986) discuss several types of decision boundaries, including minimum distance bounds, general linear bounds, and likelihood-ratio bounds.
A systematic comparison between the GCM and the numerous models that derive from the general recognition theory goes beyond the scope of this article, and only a few preliminary remarks can be made here. First, it should be noted that a very simple rule-based model formalizing a "value-on-dimensions" view seems unable to account for the present data. By a valueon-dimensions view, I mean a model in which the subject establishes a linear bound parallel to the coordinate axes. For example, in the brightness categorization, the subject might adopt the rule: "Respond Category 1 if the value on the brightness dimension is greater than or equal to 5" (see Figure 5) . Because Stimuli 5,6, and 7 have approximately the same level of brightness, a value-on-dimensions view predicts that they will be classified in Category 1 with equal probability. The observed probability of classifying Transfer Stimulus 5 in Category 1 (.53), however, is clearly different from the corresponding probabilities for Exemplars 6 and 7 (.86 and .92, respectively). The same problem arises for Stimuli 2, 6, and 11 in both the saturation (A) and saturation (B) categorizations.
Given its power and flexibility, it is likely that some version of the general recognition theory will be able to account for the identification and categorization data reported herein, although it is unclear whether a model using the same number of parameters will do appreciably better than the GCM. In any case, it should be noted that the context model was originally designed with "ill-defined" category structures in mind (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) and has already been applied successfully in that domain. In the present study, the category structures were fairly "well-defined" in the sense that one could describe them in terms of simple rules. That the context model is competitive in the domains of both ill-defined and well-defined categorization is an interesting point in its favor (see also Nosofsky, 1984b Nosofsky, , 1986 .
Conclusions
In this research, support was provided for the multidimensional scaling-choice approach to modeling the identification and categorization of perceptual stimuli. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that excellent predictions of categorization learning could be generated given knowledge of performance in an identification learning condition. The model that was used assumed that essentially the same principles of exemplar-based generalization that governed subjects* identification learning also governed their categorization learning, thereby providing support for the exemplar view of category representation. Various alternative categorization models were unable to provide as general or as accurate an account of the results.
It should be emphasized, however, that I am not referring to an invariant form of exemplar-based generalization, but to one that is context dependent. According to the present interpretation, selective attention processes that are brought to bear on the psychological representation may result in systematic changes in similarity relations across the identification and categorization paradigms. Indeed, to account for the present identification and categorization data within the unified framework provided by the MDS-choice model and the GCM, I needed to assume that there were changes in similarity relations (as defined by the mj parameters in Equations 1 and 2). These changes could be described systematically in terms of the posited selective attention process. Of course, it may be possible to achieve an equally parsimonious account of the identification and categorization data reported herein using a different theoretical framework in which similarity is defined in an alternative way. My conclusion about the role of selective attention in modifying similarity is intended to apply within the present exemplarbased, multidimensional scaling-choice framework.
One question that this research has not addressed concerns the interpretation of the selective attention weights in terms of perception or decision processes. As suggested earlier in the section on identification learning, it seems unlikely that perceptual confusability played a major role in this study. Given the type of stimuli and experimental conditions, it seems more sensible to attribute the performance limitations to imperfect memory. Following this line of conjecture, the selective-attention weights were probably not reflecting a modified perceptual representation, but perhaps a decision process in which certain aspects of the stimuli were weighted more heavily than other aspects in arriving at a categorization response. Alternatively, perhaps the weights can be interpreted in terms of the precision with which the different aspects of the stimuli were represented in memory (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978, pp. 210-211) . In any case, the changes in similarity relations that occurred across the identification and categorization paradigms are probably more appropriately viewed as changes in cognitive similarity than perceptual similarity. Under different experimental conditions, some form of perceptual attention may also be involved. For example, if stimuli are presented for short exposure durations, selective attention to relevant dimensions might yield a richer internal perceptual representation. Future research will need to examine more carefully alternative process interpretations for the selective attention weights.
In concluding their seminal study on the relationship between the identification and categorization of integral stimuli, Shepard and Chang (1963) noted that although the overall pattern of predictions was fairly good, there were indeed some systematic deviations for some of the individual classification conditions. They closed their discussion by noting:
The easy classifications tend to differ from the more difficult ones in that their points can be roughly partitioned into the two subclasses simply by drawing a straight line through the two-dimensional space. Conceivably, under this condition the space becomes somehow "polarized" and, hence, renders the relevant direction (or dimension) through the space more salient. Much as in abstraction, then, the task would reduce to learning a division of the stimuli into two clusters along that single dimension, (p. 102)
The present research provides clearer evidence that some form of "polarization" or "abstraction" may indeed be involved when subjects learn to categorize integral stimuli. Moreover, we have formalized these notions of polarization and abstraction within the confines of a rigorous quantitative model. that any given stimulus could establish only a single representation in memory, i.e., multiple representations of the same stimulus could not occur. Thus, at any given time during the learning sequence, a stimulus has either established its single representation in memory or it has not. Once the representation is established, it remains in memory for the duration of the learning sequence.
The relevant equation for choosing a stimulus is if Sj c kJ = 0 ifS^#,
where P(S/|S/) denotes the probability of choosing stimulus; given presentation of stimulus i, and where # denotes the subset of stimuli that are stored in memory. It was also assumed that no stimulus was chosen if the overall summed similarity <jf S, to all the stored exemplars did not exceed some criterion ait. In this latter case, the subject was assumed to guess randomly. A response-learning process, analogous to the one discussed for the other models, was also assumed to occur. The only difference was the assumption that response labels could not become associated with stimuli that were not yet stored in memory. The parameters in the model were the exemplar storage probability (pstor), the summed similarity criterion {crit) y the response-learning parameter (p), and the sensitivity parameter (c).
The best-fitting parameters and summary fits for each of the alternative models are reported in Table A-1. A grid search was used to obtain the best-fitting parameters. Note that the actual fit that is obtained for any particular model will vary from simulation to simulation. However, this variation was small relative to the differences between the model fits reported in Table A-1. The simulated dynamic MDS-choice model fits the data better than any of the alternative simulated learning models. The restricted dynamic MDS-choice model does considerably worse than the general model, having obvious difficulties in Blocks 1 and 3. This pattern is identical to the one observed previously when the analytic model was fitted to the data.
The use of the resampling parameter improves the fit of the restricted dynamic MDS-choice model. The reason for the improvement is as follows. Note that when sensitivity is held constant, learning is assumed to arise solely from the gradual attachment of response labels to the stimulus memory representations. The response-learning parameter (p) is set very low to allow the model to describe changes in performance over blocks. (If the value of p were large, learning would occur extremely rapidly and the model would be unable to predict changes in performance across Blocks 2 and 3.) Because the response-learning parameter is low, there will be a high probability of having stimulus representations with no associated response labels during Block 1 and part of Block 2. Without a resampling process, the model would make many random guesses and would therefore overpredict the number of confusions among highly dissimilar stimuli (e.g., 1 and 12). The resampling process leads the model to guess with response labels that are attached to stimuli that are at least fairly similar to the presented stimulus. Still, the resampling model performs substantially worse than the dynamic MDSchoice model in accounting for the identification learning data. Unfortunately, I was unable to detect any systematic reasons for the differential error when I inspected the predicted and observed data values for each model.
Allowing the sampling limit parameter to increase over blocks improved the fit of the model relatively little. Basically, the sampling limit parameter has little effect during the later trials of the learning sequence because virtually all the stimulus-response associations are established at that point.
The probabilistic exemplar storage model accounted for the data far better than the restricted dynamic MDS-choice model. If the probability of storing exemplars were very high, this model would essentially be the same as the restricted dynamic MDS-choice model, which is clearly inadequate. If the probability of storing exemplars were very low, the model would predict a high degree of random guessing, in contrast to the observed data. The intermediate value of the exemplar storage parameter avoids these problems. There is improvement in fit relative to the restricted dynamic MDS-choice model because during learning the model "guesses" using response labels that are attached to stimuli that are at least fairly similar to the presented stimulus. Thus, the model Note. I = increment by which the parameter was varied in the grid search; p = response-learning parameter; c = sensitivity parameter; k = sampling limit parameter; pstor = exemplar storage probability; and crit = summed similarity criterion.
avoids completely random guessing and at the same time allows for substantial improvements in performance to occur over the course of the learning sequence. Still, the probabilistic exemplar storage model fares considerably worse than the dynamic MDS-choice model in which changes in similarity relations occurred over trials. Possibly, some combination of the alternative learning processes considered in this Appendix would yield as good an account of the identification data as the dynamic MDS-choice model. It is not my intent to imply that resampling and probabilistic exemplar storage do not occur. Both processes may turn out to be significant components of a fully specified identification learning model. However, it appears that neither process in and of itself accounts for the present identification learning data as well as the assumption that similarity relations among exemplars decrease over trials. The interactions involved in storing exemplars in memory, learning stimulus-response associations, resampling information from memory, and learning to discriminate among similar stimuli are undoubtedly extremely complex and can be understood only with a great deal of additional research.
